2/2/43 - this day in history

[Johnny Velvet]

Great thread derailment, great posts from Kev, Muukalainen and Nick. I almost feel ashamed throwing in my two cents but this aspect of history has always been one of my favourites and I don't get to discuss it very often, so...

In my post #32, I wrote: “military and technologically speaking, the French were less advanced than the Germans”.

About the number of tanks they both had, there are numbers available (I've just quoted them, both armies had roughly the same number of tanks) but we don't seem to know for certain how many of these 2,500+ tanks on either side were really operational and effective, there seems to be a lot of "unusable" or obsolete material. Just to say that it's not just a question of number, it's all relative. It also depends on their positioning of course and other factors too (it is a long border and vast hinterland to defend).

I wouldn't be anywhere near as well-qualified as you (or Nick) to discuss the technical merits or otherwise of French and German armour during the Battle of France seeing as most of my knowledge is drawn from the (superb) Battlefield documentary series of the mid-Nineties and Anthony Beevor's work. But one thing I do recall perhaps sheds some light on how the two armies deployed their armour and why there was such a disparity in effectiveness. The primary French battle tank at the time was the Char-B1, a lumbering hulk of a vehicle that was heavily armoured and larger than the Panzers of the time. Taken in isolation it was a formidable weapon (40mm armour compared to 15-30mm armour on the Panzer III) with superior armament to all German tanks fielded in the battle. But, if I remember correctly, there were two things that served as a significant obstacle to its effective use. The first was a design flaw of sorts in that its crew of four needed to multi-task. The tank commander had to double as either radio operator or gun loader meaning that in the middle of battle he would have to break off from giving commands to receive instructions from HQ, leaving the tank vulnerable. Each of the five members of a Panzer crew on the other hand had just one job, as the meme goes - commander, gunner, loader, driver, radio operator. Instructions could be received and commands given without any adverse effect on performance. The second problem was how the two armies deployed their tanks. The Germans, famously with blitzkrieg, concentrated their forces and heavy weaponry in a single "punch" with armoured units in particular endowed with a level of comparative autonomy that allowed them to seek and destroy enemy units that they deemed vulnerable and to exploit weaknesses in enemy lines wherever they found them. This wasn't the case with the French, or indeed British, forces aligned against them who were essentially prepared to fight the last war and consequently spread their forces and armour across the broadest front possible. The result of all this meant that whenever French tanks came into contact with their German equivalents they would invariably be outnumbered and outmanoeuvred. This is before even considering the fact that communication between German units was far more organised and sophisticated with messages being relayed via radio and almost constant contact between field HQs and their forward units. Some French units hadn't even been issued with field radios and relied on messages being delivered via motorbike or jeep.

One of the most jaw-dropping revelations in the Battlefield documentary on the Battle of France was the fact that, on the eve of the German invasion, the French army and government had already suffered a fatal blow to its effectiveness thanks to the conflict between Reynaud and Gamelin. Reynaud, the French prime minister, was apparently aware for some time that the German army posed a far more serious threat to France than envisioned by the ancien régime of the French army high command. He'd long pressed for the creation of armoured corps but his requests were repeatedly dismissed. He was an opponent of Gamelin and described him as a "nerveless philosopher" but was unable to sack the old man as Gamelin's political allies would come to his support whenever Reynaud broached the possibility. I found that astonishing - here was the leader of a nation on the verge of being invaded and thanks to the intransigence and disunity of his government he was unable to perform a function as seemingly obvious and basic as choosing who should lead France in its defence against Germany. I find it difficult to imagine that happening virtually anywhere else, even given the politics of the time. I'd love to know more about the circumstances of that and to hear your opinion about why there was such resistance to change in the upper echelons of the French military.

[Muukalainen]

The second problem was how the two armies deployed their tanks. The Germans, famously with blitzkrieg, concentrated their forces and heavy weaponry in a single "punch" with armoured units in particular endowed with a level of comparative autonomy that allowed them to seek and destroy enemy units that they deemed vulnerable and to exploit weaknesses in enemy lines wherever they found them. This wasn't the case with the French, or indeed British, forces aligned against them who were essentially prepared to fight the last war and consequently spread their forces and armour across the broadest front possible.

To an extent, these deployments are inherent in attacking and defending, no matter who the protagonists are. The attackers get to choose their point of attack whereas the defenders have to guess where it will fall. Even with very good reconnaissance and a decent understanding on the part of the defenders of the attackers dispositions (which it appears the French didn't have), there is still going to be some element of doubt about what the attackers will do, and this will naturally lead you to spread your resources. The less information you have the more likely you are to spread your resources, simply because if you concentrate in the wrong place then the first enemy attack is likely to punch through your defences.

What is clearly essential in these circumstances is having the ability to respond rapidly and flexibly as the situation develops, so that you can concentrate your resources where they are most needed. From what I've read, it seems that the Germans were very good at this and the French weren't.

[Johnny Velvet]

To an extent, these deployments are inherent in attacking and defending, no matter who the protagonists are. The attackers get to choose their point of attack whereas the defenders have to guess where it will fall. Even with very good reconnaissance and a decent understanding on the part of the defenders of the attackers dispositions (which it appears the French didn't have), there is still going to be some element of doubt about what the attackers will do, and this will naturally lead you to spread your resources. The less information you have the more likely you are to spread your resources, simply because if you concentrate in the wrong place then the first enemy attack is likely to punch through your defences.

Agreed but what I think it shows is that the Germans had learned from the mistakes of the First World War and realised that simply trying to push Allied forces back all along the front was simply going to lead to attritional warfare and a new strategy was required. French military thinking hadn't changed at all in the interwar period, or at least it seems that not enough key players had changed their views. The top brass never seemed to get a hold on the gravity of the situation - when Gamelin was finally removed from his post he was replaced with Maxime Weygand, a similarly aged leader recalled from semi-retirement in Syria, who said that his first mission upon reaching France would be to "get a good night's sleep." The outlook the two men shared was completely outdated.

[Pérou Flaquettes]

Thanks Muuk and Reginald, will try to come back to his thread sometime this week but not today as, among other urgent things, I'm busy writing several long-ish posts to put in the French News thread (of whatever it's called, can't remember the exact name of thread, it's been so long) as it has sunk into oblivion and needs resurrecting, well "need" as in "it would be good to", I suppose someone's gotta do it as they say.

[NickSTFU]

Ah, all right, I see. Well, a tad exaggerated probably (I was thinking of this new Brexit pie-in-the-sky scheme Volunteers to man borders in ‘Dad’s Army’ guard plan, it was a nod to that really, I really liked that programme, I knew next to nothing about the Home Guard when I started watching it when I arrived in England so I suppose it's dear to my heart!) but reading all this stuff I've posted in French and English in posts #32 & #43 and other material I've come across, it seems to me that there was an awful lot of unusable or obsolete equipment used during that Battle of France on the French side, hence that tongue-in-cheek Dad's Army comment.

The French were not just overrun, tactically outfoxed and outflanked, they were also beaten by a better-equipped army and air force by the looks of it. I suppose it makes sense and ties in with what I wrote in post #32 on how the successive French gvts under-invested in the interwar period in modern equipment and in the air force, which triggered the wrath of Pétain and De Gaulle in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s (De Gaulle was only a mid-ranking officer in the late 1920s-early 1930s but was already fairly influential as he was an understudy of Pétain - the two got along well actually, professionally speaking I mean -, De Gaulle was a strategist, gave military conferences etc.), these two could see that the French defence strategy was too defensive/passive, they knew the Germans would be more mobile etc. they both were against the Maginot Line or at least how the French obsessed over it from the moment its construction was decided i.e circa 1926-27 (they just didn't think it would prove that effective as they - rightly- thought that the Germans would bypass it, but the French gvt ploughed on regardless with the extensive fortifications, they were fooled by the Siegfried Line and hugely overdid the Maginot Line, which is what the Germans wanted).

But Pétain and De Gaulle (two rare dissenting voices) could do nothing about it, although they too under-estimated the importance of air force on the battlefield and the German air force in particular, how important it would turn out to be (also explains why the French gvt had under-invested in tanks with anti-aircraft artillery in the interwar period, not many in the French camp among the top brass realised how important it was to have a strong air force, what I wrote in post #32 that they were infantry-driven), they were woefully under-equipped to deal with the powerful Luftwaffe cf the quotes from the English wiki page of the Battle of France in my previous post: "The combined Allied total was 2,935 aircraft, about half the number of the German force, the Luftwaffe was (at the time) the most experienced, well-equipped and well-trained air force in the world."; "The French Army was of mixed quality [...] serious qualitative deficiency was a lack of anti-aircraft artillery, mobile anti-tank artillery").

Hello Kev, I'll reply to this one.

The French high command expected to fight a set-piece battle as in WWI. Jeffery Gunsburg in Divided and Conquered: The French High Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940 argues that in this type of battle in Belgium French tanks performed very well and out-performed the Panzers. This is, of course, because the best equipped and front line French divisions moved up to Belgium and while the main German thrust came through the Ardennes against 'weaker' divisions.

It is worth noting that the German Panzer divisions also had obsolete equipment. According to wiki, 523 Panzer Is were operational along with 955 Panzer IIs. There were only 627 of the more powerful Panzer III and IVs. The German's also had some decent Czech tanks that they'd nicked.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzer...gn_in_the_west

The French had the excellent SOMUA S35 and the previously discussed Char B1. RC is right about the Char, but remember the French expected to fight a set-piece battle and a defensive one at that. The Char was designed with that in mind and very good it was to in that defensive environment.

Technology wise I'd agree that the Germans were more advanced . All their tanks had radios for example, but they also advanced in doctrine and planning, which is what really won the campaign.

I agree that second and third line units were poorly equipped, but then these type of units are/were, on all sides.

There appears to be a solid argument that the Luftwaffe was already stretched by May 1940 after the Polish campaign. When we talk numbers we need to find out how many aircraft were actually serviceable and what counts as a 'combat' aircraft. I've seen some sources suggest that the JU 52 was a combat aircraft (it could be used as a bomber). Another example, is aircraft types. The JU 87, was used in large numbers and the mainstay of the 'all arms' doctrine, but was very vulnerable, likewise the Me 110. The Me 109 was excellent of course.

Having said that the Luftwaffe were of course very well trained and experienced as already discussed.

[NickSTFU]

Anyway, look it's not about right and wrong, but interpretation.

As I always say....