75 years ago today, the French Army signed the armistice in the Forest of Compéigne concluding the epochal Battle Of France.
The classic interpretation condemns lack of backbone and morale within the French Army exacerbated by the moral decadence of the Third Republic, in particular during the Popular Front years of Leon Blum. This narrative began almost immediately with the installation of the Vichy regime and its attempts to legitimize itself, but post war also found support with the publication of Marc Bloch’s L'Étrange Défaite. The best-known books in English supporting this position is Alastair Horne’s To Lose A Battle: France 1940 and William L Shirer’s The Collapse Of The Third Republic.
However, in recent years there has been a spate of revisionist analysis questioning the fundamentals as to how ill prepared the French Army and the Third Republic was and the conduct of the French Army on the battlefield. Ernest May’s “Strange Victory”, its title an inversion of Bloch, argues that the catastrophe was a straight military defeat caused by the total failure of the French Intelligence services and the French military high command whose doctrine was based upon a WWI static defence. May argues that French intelligence (Deuxième Bureau) failed utterly to pick up on the formidable amount of “chatter” emanating from the Ardennes area in April-May 1940. The information that was given to the French high command was ignored and the Ardennes area continued to be guarded by the inexperienced ninth and second armies. Had the proper response been undertaken, the German advance through the Ardennes might have been fatally held up.
Despite the overwhelming numbers of the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe concentrated on the Ardennes area and the inexperience of the French ninth and second armies, there were incidents where only the personal bravery of Rommel and Guderian stopped the collapse of the German thrust in the face of the ferocity of initial French resistance. They also had extraordinary good luck in pontoon crossing where despite intense French artillery bombardment, the crossing Wehrmacht were not touched. As Rommel noted in his diary whilst commending the resistance of the French Army- “We were through the Maginot line. It was hardly conceivable”.
Retreat after the Ardennes breakthrough was not a capitulation but a fighting if doomed retreat. Numbers of deaths and casualties on both sides prove this. In one month of fighting, the Germans had 50,000 killed and 160,000 wounded. In addition, of 3000 Panzers, 1800 were destroyed or put out of action and 1600 Luftwaffe planes were lost. On the “cowardly” French side, there were 360,000 dead and wounded. Notably the French First Army who covered the retreat to Dunkirk was encircled and constantly pounded by artillery and Luftwaffe bombing for four days but halted the German advance on Dunkirk, saving an estimated 100,000 soldiers in the process. In the south, the Alpin Chasseurs defeated the Italian advance in the dying days of the Battle.
If the backbone and fighting spirit of the French soldier can be partially rehabilitated, the less can be said about the French high command. Suffused with anti-republican sentiment, Maurice Gamelin was Commander in Chief more for his staunch Republicanism than for his abilities. After the breakthrough at Sedan, Gamelin, Weygand and the French top brass had absolutely no idea how to stem the tide. A battle was lost, not only on the battlefield but also in the Third Republic. Anti-republican authoritarians led by Pétain actively undermined Prime Minister Reynaud and the resisters (including de Gaulle) in the last two weeks of the struggle.
As Simone de Beauvoir noted in her memoirs:
The Third Republic- not defeated in the main due to the internecine squabbles of its politicians, its “failure” to rearm (between 1918-39, the Third Republic spent more of its GNP on military than any of the other powers) or the lack of backbone of its army, but defeated by an exceptionally poor intelligence service and the anti-Republican, authoritarian tendencies of a doctrinaire military command.
Some historians argue that the Battle of France is the fulcrum of the 20th Century. Had the initial invasion been successfully held back, a protracted stalemate and negotiated peace may have occurred. The fall meant the British had to call back a substantial percentage of its fleet from the Far East to defend the Mediterranean lines. The Japanese took full advantage of the defeat of France and the Royal Navy’s reduction, moving into French Indo-China, fatefully signing the tripartite treaty with the Axis powers whilst threatening British possessions and bringing the USA to the periphery of the war.
Stalin’s reaction to the fall was to annex Black Sea territories from Romania and the Balkan countries. Hitler, worried about the loss of German influence in the Balkans, set in motion the planning for Barbarossa and with his startling success, could brook no criticism from Wehrmacht high command for the fateful drive into the USSR.
For Britain, her foreign policy doctrine was completely reoriented. From long running mutual antipathy towards the United States, winning support of the USA became Britain’s most important foreign policy objective and the Anglo-American alliance was born.
The Fall of France changed a European War into a World War with all of its consequences and for better or worse, we are all a product of those fateful 6 weeks 75 years ago.
The classic interpretation condemns lack of backbone and morale within the French Army exacerbated by the moral decadence of the Third Republic, in particular during the Popular Front years of Leon Blum. This narrative began almost immediately with the installation of the Vichy regime and its attempts to legitimize itself, but post war also found support with the publication of Marc Bloch’s L'Étrange Défaite. The best-known books in English supporting this position is Alastair Horne’s To Lose A Battle: France 1940 and William L Shirer’s The Collapse Of The Third Republic.
However, in recent years there has been a spate of revisionist analysis questioning the fundamentals as to how ill prepared the French Army and the Third Republic was and the conduct of the French Army on the battlefield. Ernest May’s “Strange Victory”, its title an inversion of Bloch, argues that the catastrophe was a straight military defeat caused by the total failure of the French Intelligence services and the French military high command whose doctrine was based upon a WWI static defence. May argues that French intelligence (Deuxième Bureau) failed utterly to pick up on the formidable amount of “chatter” emanating from the Ardennes area in April-May 1940. The information that was given to the French high command was ignored and the Ardennes area continued to be guarded by the inexperienced ninth and second armies. Had the proper response been undertaken, the German advance through the Ardennes might have been fatally held up.
Despite the overwhelming numbers of the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe concentrated on the Ardennes area and the inexperience of the French ninth and second armies, there were incidents where only the personal bravery of Rommel and Guderian stopped the collapse of the German thrust in the face of the ferocity of initial French resistance. They also had extraordinary good luck in pontoon crossing where despite intense French artillery bombardment, the crossing Wehrmacht were not touched. As Rommel noted in his diary whilst commending the resistance of the French Army- “We were through the Maginot line. It was hardly conceivable”.
Retreat after the Ardennes breakthrough was not a capitulation but a fighting if doomed retreat. Numbers of deaths and casualties on both sides prove this. In one month of fighting, the Germans had 50,000 killed and 160,000 wounded. In addition, of 3000 Panzers, 1800 were destroyed or put out of action and 1600 Luftwaffe planes were lost. On the “cowardly” French side, there were 360,000 dead and wounded. Notably the French First Army who covered the retreat to Dunkirk was encircled and constantly pounded by artillery and Luftwaffe bombing for four days but halted the German advance on Dunkirk, saving an estimated 100,000 soldiers in the process. In the south, the Alpin Chasseurs defeated the Italian advance in the dying days of the Battle.
If the backbone and fighting spirit of the French soldier can be partially rehabilitated, the less can be said about the French high command. Suffused with anti-republican sentiment, Maurice Gamelin was Commander in Chief more for his staunch Republicanism than for his abilities. After the breakthrough at Sedan, Gamelin, Weygand and the French top brass had absolutely no idea how to stem the tide. A battle was lost, not only on the battlefield but also in the Third Republic. Anti-republican authoritarians led by Pétain actively undermined Prime Minister Reynaud and the resisters (including de Gaulle) in the last two weeks of the struggle.
As Simone de Beauvoir noted in her memoirs:
“At 12.30 a fatherly military voice echoed around the dining room. ’I am giving myself personally to France that her misfortunes may thereby be lessened. It is with a heavy heart that I tell you today that we must give up the struggle.’ Pétain: the hero of Verdun, the ambassador who had hastened to congratulate Franco on his victory. The tone of his homily made my gorge rise…they were all lying these generals and other notables who had sabotaged the war because they preferred Hitler to the Popular Front”.
Some historians argue that the Battle of France is the fulcrum of the 20th Century. Had the initial invasion been successfully held back, a protracted stalemate and negotiated peace may have occurred. The fall meant the British had to call back a substantial percentage of its fleet from the Far East to defend the Mediterranean lines. The Japanese took full advantage of the defeat of France and the Royal Navy’s reduction, moving into French Indo-China, fatefully signing the tripartite treaty with the Axis powers whilst threatening British possessions and bringing the USA to the periphery of the war.
Stalin’s reaction to the fall was to annex Black Sea territories from Romania and the Balkan countries. Hitler, worried about the loss of German influence in the Balkans, set in motion the planning for Barbarossa and with his startling success, could brook no criticism from Wehrmacht high command for the fateful drive into the USSR.
For Britain, her foreign policy doctrine was completely reoriented. From long running mutual antipathy towards the United States, winning support of the USA became Britain’s most important foreign policy objective and the Anglo-American alliance was born.
The Fall of France changed a European War into a World War with all of its consequences and for better or worse, we are all a product of those fateful 6 weeks 75 years ago.